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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
This Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to 
Section 78-2-2(3)(i), Utah Code Annotated, as amended* 
ISSUES FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD FOR REVIEW 
(1) Did appellants sustain and prove recoverable cause-°f-
action damages by reason of appellees1 overlapping mineral filing? 
(2) Were appellants, acting as pro se litigants, thereby-
barred from recovering the reasonable value of legal and related 
services, and other expenses incurred, as damages, in clearing the 
title to their mining claims? 
(3) Are appellants entitled to recover, as damages, the 
reasonable value of their pro se legal services and other expenses 
on this appeal? 
Except for a review of several factual matters pertaining 
to damages in Issue (1), the other two issues question whether 
appellants are barred from recovering cause-of-action damages by 
reason of their pro se appearance in this case (and" on this appeal)* 
It will require an analysis and an interpretation of the 
Utah case of Smith v. Batchelor (1992), 832 P* 2d 467, both mth-
in the context of the factual and legal situation presented in 
that case, as well as a determination of the scope and extent of 
the broad—and somewhat gratuitous—statement enunciated in that 
case, which, if interpreted in the manner adopted by the trial cotrrt 
in this case, would bar an attorney-litigant from recovering both 
as a successful party (on the substantive cause of action) and for 
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services performed in litigat ing and securing that recovery (pro-
cedurally); and, further, 
If in this appeal the trial court's all-inclusive interpret-
ation of the pro-se-litigant rule of Smith v, Batchelor should.be 
adopted, it will be necessary for this Court to reconcile that 
broad interpretation with Utah Constitution Article I, Section 7 
(due process of law), Section 11 (the right to pursue a civil case 
pro se) and Section 24 (equal protection of the laws), together with 
the guarantee of those basic constitutional rights against state 
action as provided by the Fourteenth Amendment to the U. S. Con-
stitution. 
MfEKMIMATITE STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Two related sections of Utah's mining law are of importance 
in understanding the basic cause of action involved in this liti-
gation. They are contained in Utah Code Anno,, 1953* as amended: 
40-1-2• Discovery monument—Notice of Location—Contents. 
The locator at the time of making the discovery of such vein 
or lode must erect a monument at the place of discovery, and 
post thereon his notice of location, which shall contain: 
(5) If a placer or millsite claim, the number of acres 
or superficial feet claimed, and such a description of the claim 
or mill site, located by reference to some natural object or per-
manent monument, as will identify the claim or mill site. 
40-1-3• Boundaries to be marked. 
Mining claims and mill site? must be distinctly marked on the 
ground so that the boundaries thereof can be readily traced. 
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The ultimate and overriding authority in this matter is the 
provision of Utah Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 11, pertaining to the 
right of pro se litigants to appear in court in their own behalf: 
Sec* ll* (Courts open—Redress of injuries.) 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury 
done to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have 
remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered with-
out denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred 
from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this 
State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is 
a party* 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This is a case where pro se litigants were denied recovery 
for cause-of-action damages in a slander-of-title action involv-
ing mining claims solely because one of the pro se plaintiffs was 
an attorney. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition in Trial Court* 
A non-jury trial was held in this matter on February 23$ 
1993$ wherein appellants sought punitive and compensatory damages 
against appellees. Appellants1 damages evidence, furnished by 
Glen E. Fuller, an attorney and quarry operator-owner, consisted 
primarily of cash outlays and time spent by him in removing the 
cloud of appellees1 mining claim, which overlapped portions of 
two mining claims belonging to appellants that had been worked 
for 37 years. 
The trial court denied punitive damages; also, it denied com-
pensatory damages because they consisted in part of the reasonable 
value of services performed by an attorney acting as a pro se 
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plaintiff* 
The Complaint was dismissed with prejudice• This appeal 
followed. 
C. Statement of Facts. 
Appellants located a building stone mining claim (Exh. P-2) 
on a large deposit of blue-green (turquoise-colored) quartzite 
stone in a mountainous area of Box Elder County in 1955 (R* 085)• 
Subsequently, in 1962 they located a contiguous millsite claim 
(Exh. P-3) upon which were constructed a crushing plant (with bins), 
storage yard, loading clocks, concrete rock bins, equipment garages, 
and a cabin. The two claims encompassed 75*379 acres (R» 005)1 ac-
cording to the official U.S. Mineral Survey, and both were located 
in the NWft and the W# of the NEK of Section 18, Tp. 13 N., R. 13 W., 
Salt Lake Base & Meridian, U.S. Survey, The Notices of Location 
filed in the Box Elder County Recorder's Office (Exhs. P-2 and 
P -3) and with the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) in Salt Lake 
City (Exhs. P-ll and P-12) all expressly stated that portions of 
both claims were located in the NEK of Section 18, as well as in 
the NWft of Section 18. 
On Sept. 14, 1991 $ appellants entered into a Quarry Sales 
Agreement (Exh. P-4) with Northern Stone Supply, Inc., of Oakley, 
Idaho, covering the two mining claims, improvements and equipment. 
Paragraph VI of the Agreement specified that, upon making the 
three required payments, appellants would convey title to the 
buyer— 
"with warranties of good and sufficient title and without 
any encumbrances existing thereon;11 
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At the time the Agreement was being finalized and during the 
course of a title examination, appellants discovered that appellees 
had recorded a building stone mining claim (Exh. P-5) on the W)£ 
of the NEK (80 acres) of Section 18 in the Box Elder County Rec-
order's Office on April 2, 1990. Appellees1 claim included the 
SE corner (and claim monument) of appellants1 Turquoise Stone Placer 
claim and almost all of their Turquoise Stone Millsite Claim (R. 002), 
including all of the improvements located thereon. (Exhs. P-1 & P-6) 
From Sept. 19 through Sept. 26, 1991, appellants, Kim G. Fuller, 
and three surveyors engaged by Northern Stone Supply, Inc. care-
fully examined all of the 80 acres covered by appellees1 Boulder 
Haven No. 1 building stone claim (R. 91-92$ 98, 139) , but they 
found no evidence that appellees had erected any Notice of Location 
on the land nor had they monumented any of the corners of their 
purported claim. 
Appellees' Answer to the Complaint (R. 013) and William 
Bown's letter to appellants dated Feb. 5* 1992 both asserted that 
their mining claim was "valid" (Exh. P-8), but on interrogation at 
trial William Bown admitted that their claim had not been monumented 
in any manner as required by law.
 K i m G# P u l l e r a l s 0 t e s t i f l e d t h a t 
his inspection of the area enclosed within appellees1 purported 
claim did not reveal monumentation of any kind* 
On Jan.24, 1992, appellants mailed four certified letters 
(Exh. P-7) to appellees demanding they immediately remove the 
cloud of the Boulder Haven No. 1 from appellants1 claims and that 
they be furnished with documentary proof of their actions. Wil-
liam Bown responded by letter on behalf of appellees on Feb. 5* 
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1992, admitting the overlap upon appellants1 valid claims, but 
stating that the overlap was accidental, mistaken and unintentional 
and that "appropriate proceedures have begun which will restore 
your claims to their prior, and proper status." The final sentence 
of the body of the letter departed from his prior conciliatory posi-
tion—and, in effect, set the stage for the litigation that follow-
ed—with the following statement: 
"You can call at the B.L.N, office for documentation of our 
amendment actions as I will provide you with none." (Exh. P-8) 
(Emphasis added) 
On interrogation at the trial, William Bown responded: 
Q. And so, in other words, we were to wait until you did 
something to clear the title and that's about what it amounted 
to, wasn't it? 
A# It was just that you could call there to find out what 
I had done. You demanded I furnish you with proof and I Just re-
sponded that you can go pick up the proof yourself. 
(R.113 ) 
On April 13, 1992, appellants checked with the B.L.M. office 
(Exh. P-13) in Salt Lake City, and on April 28 and May 1, 1992, 
they traveled to Brigham City and inspected the files and records 
in the Box Elder Recorders Office, but appellees had done nothing 
to clear the title of appellants' claims by "amendment proceedures" 
or otherwise. Thereupon, after waiting more than three months, on 
May 1, 1992, appellants filed their Complaint to quiet title, based 
on slander-of-title allegations, seeking compensatory and punitive 
damages, and other relief. 
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Summons and Complaint were served on Ronald L. Bown on May 6, 
1992 (R. 009), and on Preston E. Bown and Jeffrey C. Bown on May 29, 
1992 (R. 010 and 01l)f but William L. Bown could not be found* 
However, after Ronald had been served, William signed, and secured 
the signatures of the other three appellees upon, a relinquishment 
of the Boulder Haven No* 1 mining claim and filed it with the B.L.M. 
office in Salt Lake City on May 18, 1992—12 days after Ronald had 
been served. Appellees took no action respecting their filing in 
the Box Elder County Recorderfs Office* 
On August 5f 1992, a private process server served Summons and 
Complaint (R. 008) on William L. Bown, who, upon being questioned 
at trial as to his whereabouts while being sought for several 
months, gave the following response: 
Q# And why did you wait nearly three months to take any 
action? 
A* Well, basically at that time in my life there were some 
other things going on that took a little more precedence as far 
as I was concerned. I knew in my heart, knowing mining laws and 
other things, I knew what my intentions would have been and I 
knew the actual harm, if any, that I had done to the title of 
your claim and also there were other things happening ...n 
(R. 114) 
(Underlining added) 
On August 10, 1992, after William had contacted his attorney 
(R. 118), appellees executed an "Abandonment and Disclaimer of 
Mining Claim"(which appellants prepared), and the same was recorded 
on that date with the Box Elder County Recorder by appellants• Thus, 
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This Exhibit P-13* modified as indicated with red additions5 was 
furnished to the trial court (R.062) along with appellants Object-
ions to proposed Findings of Fact and in support of Motion for 
Judgment in the amount of title-clearing costs: $2,334*39* 
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the encumbrance on the title of appellants' mining claims was fin-
ally removed. (Exh. P-10) 
Appellees refused to pay appellants anything by way of reimb-
ursement for their expenses and time spent prior to August 10, 1992, 
in clearing title to the latters' mining claim 3 (R«145-146 ), so 
the matter proceeded to trial before Judge Hyde, sitting without a 
jury, on Feb. 23, 1993. 
At the close of the trial, Judge Hyde announced that he would 
not award any punitive damages but that "the question of whether 
you are entitled to attorney fees to clear that title I'm not pre-
pared to rule on at this time and I will consider that." (R.149 ) 
(Underlining added) 
Cn Feb. 26, 1993, after reviewing the parties' Trial Briefs, 
Judge Hyde issued a Memorandum Decision, ruling as follows: 
"The only matter not ruled upon at trial was Plaintiff's 
request for attorney fees. 
I hold that the case of Smith v. Batchelor, 832 P 2d 467 
(1992) is controlling. That case holding 'That Pro Se Liti-
gants should not recover Attorney Fees regardless of their 
professional status' is applicable to this case." 
(R. 056) 
As soon thereafter as appellees' counsel prepared and served 
proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment, ap-
pellants immediately prepared and served their Objections to the 
same (R. 058-059), together with a Motion for Judgment (in favor 
of appellants) in the sum of at least $2,334.39, which amount rep-
resented necessary out-of-pocket expenses and the reasonable value 
of their services up to and including August 10, 1992—but not 
thereafter—as damages incurred in clearing title to their mining 
claims. (See breakdown of Exh. P-13 charges on opposite page) 
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Appellants contended, as they had previously maintained in 
their trial Briefs, that Smith v. Batchelor did not preclude their 
recovery in the circumstances. 
Appellants' Objections and Motion were filed with the Court 
on March 11, 1993 (R« 058), together with courtesy copies for 
Judge Hyde, and appellees filed no response. Without further rul-
ing, and disregarding appellants1 Objections and Motion, the trial 
Court signed and entered the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, 
and Judgment, as submitted by appellees, on March 191 1993$ dis-
missing the Complaint with prejudice. (R* 067-068) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Appellants, appearing as pro se plaintiffs in the trial court, 
were denied their right under the Utah Constitution and the Four-
teenth Amendment to the U. S. Constitution to recover cause-of-
action damages for a wrong committed against them and their 
properties by appellees. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
APPELLANTS PROVED THAT THEY SUSTAINED RECOVERABLE DAMAGES 
BY REASON OF APPELLEES1 OVERLAPPING MINERAL PILING. 
Appellants1 Complaint (R.00l)alleged ownership of their two 
placer and millsite mining claims (including legal descriptions 
established by a certified U. S. mineral survey), that portions 
of both claims were located in the Vest % of the NEK of Section IS, 
Tp. 13 N., R. 13 W., S. L. B. & M., U. S. Survey, that appellees 
recorded and filed their overlapping Boulder Haven #1 mining claim 
of April 2, 1990 (which included appellants1 cabin, rock bins, 
storage garages, yard, crushing plant and headquarters area—approx-
imately 5 acres). 
Appellees admitted the foregoing allegations, but denied fur-
ther allegations, claiming that their claim was valid as to the 
portion of the 80 acres that was not overlapped and that their 
recording and filing were made in good faith. With respect to 
appellants1 claim for punitive an^ compensatory (special) damages 
incurred in removing the cloud from their title, appellees asserted 
that appellants sustained "no loss." (R. 014) 
As set forth in the Statement of Facts, the testimony of Kim 
G. Fuller (R# 91-92,98) and the admissions of appellee William L. 
Eown (S. 130 ) conclusively established that appellees failed to 
erect a Notice of Location or to monument any of the corners of 
their alleged claim on the ground as required by law: 
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4-0-1-2. Discovery monument—Notice of Location—Contents« 
The locator at the time of making the discovery of such vein 
or lode must erect a monument at the place of discovery, and 
post thereon his notice of location, which shall contain: 
(5) If a placer or millsite claim, the number of acres 
or superficial feet claimed, and such a description of the claim 
or mill site, located by reference to some natural object or per-
manent monument, as will identify the claim or mill site. 
4-0-1-3. Boundaries to be marked. 
Mining claims and mill sites must be distinctly marked on the 
ground so that the boundaries thereof can be readily traced. 
And see Fuller v. Mountain Sculpture, Inc. (1957)* 6 U, 2d 3?3, 
314 P. 2d 840, where, 35 years earlier, "claim Jumpers11 attempted 
to acquire a portion of the northwest corner of this same placer 
claim. 
Although William Bown attempted to explain, in terms of what 
would be found (R# 125) i n areas where U.S. government surveys 
exist in a feeble effort to "monument" his claim, his vague explan-
ation was inadequate and wrong. The U. S. survey system monuments 
the four cardinal corners of each section (640 acres, more or less); 
in addition, between each of the four one-mile courses going around 
each section, monuments are placed at intervals of one-half mile 
(called quarter corners). Thus, each section will have eight mon-
uments. And since the WJ4 of the NE# of Section 18 is 80 acres, 
the only government monument that would be present would be found 
at the NV corner of the 80 acres (i.e., at the north quarter corner 
of Section 18). And it was not until the early summer of 1992, 
when the U. S. mineral surveyor was working the area, that Kim G. 
Fuller and appellant Glen E. Fuller located that monument, sans any 
evidence of a mineral monument of any kind. ( R.94f X48-149) 
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In the absence of proper posting and monumentation, appellees1 
contentions as set forth in their Answer (5,013) and Trial Brief 
that their claim was "valid" and that they were "junior appropria-
tors" (over and above a .millsite claim, no less, without citing 
authority), all must fail. Their "paper claim" was void; in short, 
appellees were "claim jumpers." 
Although appellee William Bown contended that the overlap 
created by his Boulder Haven #1 "claim" was unintentional and ac-
cidental, the background facts support a different scenario. Be-
fore filing his "claim" he went to the BLM office and .examined the 
Fuller file and (only) the map therein accompanying (only) appell-
ants' placer claim (R« 12?, 134 and Exhs. P-ll and D-2). Curious-
ly, he failed to give any reason for neglecting to further examine 
the file, which also contained appellants1 contiguous, and easterly, 
millsite claim. He concluded that his "claim" would not overlap 
any part of appellants1 placer claim, but he saw no reason to fur-
ther examine the file. (Exh. P-2 and R. 127, 131
 f 134-135) 
The evidence must be assessed as establishing that William 
Bown was well aware that appellants' millsite area was within the 
W% of the NEK of Section 18 and that, whether believing that ap-
pellants' claim was faulty or that it did not exist as to that 
area, he intentionally and deliberately filed upon the millsite 
area* 
Q. (Mr. Fuller) What was your purpose to check the files in 
the first place? 
A. To make sure I wasn't going to be overlapping. 
I knew where your claims were basically within a hundred yards, 
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I knev/ that, common sense, because I'd been there a lot. I pulled 
that map to make sure we werent1 clipping into your claim. 
Q. You've been over there a lot, havenft you, on our claims? 
A. You bet. 
(H.135) 
Q. So you've known that area quite well, haven't you? 
A. I know the area ...as far as site pretty well. 
(H.136 ) 
William Bown's intimate knowledge of the millsite area cer-
tainly made him cognizant of the fact that there were substantial 
operations and improvements located east of appellants1 placer 
claim. He had also been a good friend of Gary Mullard (Northern 
Stone Supply, Inc.) from about the time of the filing of appellees 
claim on April 2, 1990 (R.119) > and William Bown was aware that 
prospective purchasers were interested in appellants' properties. 
Moreover, he knew that Mullard was interested in "green" stone 
(R. 121) and, had he found a flaw in, or no filing of, a claim to 
appellants' millsite area, he would have been in a strong "bargain-
ing position" if appellants were to make a sale. 
A. (William Bown) He (Mullard) needed green, he wanted to 
get involved in the green, and T tried to set him up and that * s 
all it was. 
( R.120 ) 
Underlining added 
If appellees' filing on the millsite area had been the only 
filing of record, or if appellants1 millsite claim had been defect-
ive for any reason, appellees could have demanded access through 
appellants1 placer claim and across the Dugway Road so as to get 
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into the upper reaches of Rock Canyon, from which they had been 
barred despite three prior unsuccessful attempts (R# 110-111)^ 
better yet, they could have claimed title to, and negotiated the 
sale of, appellants1 millsite area and all of its improvements• 
Unfortunately for appellees, their further research at the 
BLM office after receiving appellants1 letter of January 24, 1992 
(Exh. P-7) revealed (R« 134) that appellants had filed and re-
corded their millsite claim (Exh. P-12), that appellees1 overlapp-
ing "paper claim" was of no value to them even if it had been valid., 
and that any plan that appellees may have concocted had come to 
naught. 
If this Court should think that mining "claims" are always 
filed for the sole purpose of extracting minerals from the ground, 
a different motive also existed in the case of Springer v. South-
ern Pacific Co, (1926), 67 U. 590, 248 P. 819. 
Appellants provided the trial court and opposing counsel with 
a detailed breakdown of time (and its reasonable value), expenses, 
and the nature of necessary steps involved in clearing title to 
their mining claims (Exh. P-15), corrraencing on Sept. 19* 1991i with 
an on-site examination of appellees' "claim" area, and extending 
through the filing of the Complaint on May 1, 1992, and terminat-
ing on August 10, 1992, when they were provided with the final 
document (Exh. P-10) that enabled appellants to remove the cloud 
from their title on the Box Elder County records. Exhibit 13 also 
provided a time-and-services summary of steps from and after Aug-
ust 10, 1992, in bringing th_? matter to trial* 
Exhibit P-13 (and see corroborating testimony—R. 13T8-142 ) 
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classified appellants' pro se services according to three sep-
arate categories, using modest hourly charges for each* As an 
attorney, only 14 hours were charged by appellant Glen E. Fuller 
to legal services up to and including August 10, 1992, the balance 
to that date being allocated to "paralegal" and "surveyor assistant" 
categories at $30 and $45 per-hour charges, respectively* Total 
services and expenses in clearing title (through August 10, 1992) 
were computed in the sum of 1*2,334.39* (Exh. P-13 a n d H. 138-142) 
Although this Court may feel reluctant to express an opinion 
as to v/hether appellants out-of-pocket expenses and their opinion of 
the reasonable value of necessary services expended are fair and 
justified, it should be noted that appellants, appearing pro se, 
were certainly in a position to best minimize trial-clearing eff-
orts and costs than would have been the case had other similar 
professional assistance been secured. "Further, and certainly an 
element that this Court should recognize, although appellant Glen 
E. Puller was interrogated by counsel for appellees on other mat-
ters, not a single item on Exhibit P-13, or his corroborating 
testimony (R*138-142),was inquired into or challenged on cross-
examination, by brief, on argument, or otherwise. The evidence 
on special damages stands uncontradicted; the only issue is whether 
appellants1 recovery is denied solely by reason of the trial court!s 
interpretation of the effect of a single Utah court case* 
Professional services are involved in most cases being tried. 
today. Doctors testify in personal injury matters and provide medi-
cal services; appraisers furnish written opinions of value and 
testify concerning the same, mechanical engineers inspect and testi-
fy concerning machinery and eouipment defects—the list is endless. 
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Lawyers1 services are invariably utilized, both in and out of 
court, in clearing title to property. As such, those expenses (or 
their reasonable value) become an element of damages* This fact 
has been recognized in two Utah slander-of-title cases: Dows e v• 
Doris Trust Co, ( W ? ) , 116 U. 106, 208 P. 2d 956, and Olsen v. 
Kidman (195D, 120 U. 44-3, 235 P. 2d 510. 
Selected excerpts taken from the two referenced cases, sup-
ported by the Restatement of Torts and 50 Am Jur 2d, are set forth 
in the following sub-topics: 
PUBLICATION BY RECORDING 
"Liability may be predicated on the filing or recording of 
a false instrument purporting to affect the title to property, 
such as an affidavit, ..." 50 Am. Jur 2d, Libel and Slander, 
Section 541. 
FALSITY OF THE WORDS 
11
 It is not necessary that the publisher of a disparaging 
statement know or believe it to be false nor is it necessary 
that as a reasonable man he should know or believe that it 
is untrue. Furthermore, it is immaterial that he has reason-
able grounds for his belief in its truth. As in an action for 
defamation, if the other essentials to liability are present, 
the publisher of disparaging matter takes the risk that it 
is untrue. " Olsen v. Kidman. 120 Utah 443, 235 P.2d 510, 
513 ( 1951), as quoted from Restatement on Torts, Section 
625. 
n
 Slander of title is effected by one who witliout privilege 
publishes untrue disparaging statements with respect to the 
property of another under such circumstances as would lead 
a reasonable person to foresee that a prospective purchaser 
or lessee thereof might abandon his intentions ... In order 
to commit the tort acjtu^ l malice or ill will is unnecessary. 
( Citing authority)"1 " Olsen v. Kidman^120-Utah 443 , 235 
P.2d 510, 512 ( 1951). 
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PECUNIARY LOSS OR SPECIAL DAMAGES 
" Thus the vendibility of land, chattels or intangible 
things may be impaired when a statement makes them 
appear less desirable for purchase, lease or other 
dealings than they actually are. But the liability 
does not accrue until the publication of the disparaging 
matter operates as a substantial factor in determining 
the decision of a prospective purchaser or other interested 
person, to refrain from buying or otherwise acquiring the 
thing in question or causes the owner to incur the expense 
of such legal proceedings as may be available or necessary 
to remove the cloud upon the vendibility that is cast upon 
it by the publication'.' ( Emphasis added) Restatement of 
Torts 2d, Section 632. 
"It is defendant's contention that plaintiff having failed to 
allege and prove a particular sale or sales which had been 
lost because of its action that plaintiff had failed to 
present for the consideration of the court, an essential 
element of the action for slander of title, i.e., a 
pecuniary loss. It is defendant's contention that attorney's 
fees are not recoverable as special damages and that such 
damages can only be proved by the loss of a particular sale 
which must be alleged as well as proved. It cites as 
authority for this contention the cases of McGuinness v. 
Hargiss, 56 Wash. 162, 105 P. 233, 21 Ann. Cas. 220, 
Hubbard v. Scott, 85 Or. 1, 166 P. 33 and City of 
Shreveport, v. Kahn, 194 La. 55, 193 So.461. All of the 
above cases have held that attorneys' fees are not re-
coverable in an action for slander of title. However, we 
are not impressed with the reasoning of those cases and 
others to the same effect. The action of slander of title 
is based on a wrongful act but for which the plaintiff would 
not have had to incur any expense, either for costs or for 
attorney's fees. The reasoning in Chesebro v. Powers, 78 
Mich. 472, 44 N.W. 290, is more in harmony with justice." 
Dowse v. Doris Trust Co.. 116 Utah 106, 208 P. 2d 956, 958 ( 1949) 
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"Attorney's fees are certainly a reasonable expense of 
litigation," Dowse v. Doris Trust Co.. 116 Utah 106, 208 
P. 2d 956, 959 ( 1949). In accord is Olsen v. Kidman, 
120 Utah 443, 235 P. 2d 510 ( 1951). 
11
 Section 633^ Pecuniary Loss ( l)The pecuniary loss for 
which a publisher of injurious falsehood is subject to 
liability is restricted to 
(a) The pecuniary loss that results directly and 
immediately from the effect on the conduct of 
third persons, including impairment of vendibility 
or value caused by disparagement, and 
(h) The expen.se of measures reasonably necessary to 
counteract the publication, including litigation to 
remove the doubts cast upon vendibility or value 
by disparagement. 
(Emphasis added) 
(2) " 
Restatement of Torts 2d, Sec, 633. 
DISPARAGING STATEMENT MAY BE ANY 
UNFOUNDED CLAIM 
"To be disparaging a statement need not be a complete denial 
of title in others, but may be any unfounded claim of an 
interest in the property which throws doubt upon its ownership. 
( citing authority)" Olsen v. Kidman. 120 Utah 443, 235 P.2d 
510, 513 { 1951). 
11
 Thus if the defendant says that the plaintiff's title to a 
particular piece of land is not good, the plaintiff must prove 
that his title is marketable since the test of a good title 
is its marketability. If, on the other hand, the disparagement 
consists of a statement that there is a particular defect in 
the other's title, the other as plaintiff need only show that 
his title is free from that defect. ff Restatement of Torts 
Second, Section 634. 
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PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
11
 The defendant real estate broker had no lien. The 
plaintiff's title was slandered when the purported 
lien was recorded without privilege to do so, ... 
The evidence also supports the award of • • • 
•. • punitive and exemplary damages•,f 
Olsen v.Kidman,120 Utah 443, 235 P. 2d 510, 513 ( 1951) 
That punitive damages may be awarded in an action for 
slander of title see Hopkins v. Drowne. 21 R. I. 20, 
41 A. 567. n Dowse v. Doris Trust Co.. 116 Utah 106, 
208 P. 2d 956, 959 ( 1949). 
The facts of this case come within the umbrella of the law, 
both as to special damages and punitive damages. In order to re-
move the cloud of appellees' claim from appellants1 properties, 
as provided for and required by their Quarry Sales Agreement 
(Exh. P-4), appellants were required to expend money and effort. 
II. 
THE UTAH CASE OP SMITH V. BATCHELOR DOES NOT PRECLUDE APP-
EEIAMTS1 EECOVERY OF DAMAGES BECAUSE OF THEIR PRO SE APPEARANCE 
AT TIBTATi> 
Implicit in the trial courtfs Memorandum Decision (R.056) 
holding that Smith v. Batchelor (Utah 1992), 832 P. 2d 467* was 
controlling in this case, was a recognition that appellants had 
in fact clearly established damages but that they could not re-
cover due to the technicality of having handled their litigation 
pro se* Appellants contend the rule of that case is otherwise• 
Smith v. Batchelor involved an employment-type claim 
based upon the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (and the corres-
ponding Utah Payment of Wages Act) for back wages and overtime pay, 
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Plaintiff, an attorney appearing pro se, was granted relief on 
the substantive portion of his claim for back wages and overtime, 
but he was denied recovery for the reasonable value of his attorney 
services in handling and litigating the claim as expressly provided 
for under the FLSA (i.e., procedural relief). 
The Utah Supreme Court interpreted the FLSA provision allowing 
for attorney's fees as follows: 
We decline to join these courts in allowing pro se attorneys 
to recover fees while lay pro se litigants go uncompensated• 
In our view, such a result discriminates between lay and at-
torney litigants. It is a sufficient advantage to a lawyer-
litigant that he or she is capable of competently presenting 
his or her claim without the need of retained counsel. Be-
cause we are loath to enhance that advantage by giving the 
lawyer-litigant recovery, not only as a successful party, but 
also as that party's attorney, we hold that pro se litigants 
should not recover attorney fees, regardless of their pro-
fessional status. 
Although the final language of the decision, if taken out of 
context, might be construed as barring all pro se litigants from 
recovering attorney fees in every manner of case, it is clear that 
the decision is limited to statute-provided attorney fees of a 
procedural nature where discrimination would allow attorney-pro-se 
litigants to recover such fees but lay-pro-se litigants could not 
recover such fees. As for the right to recover on the basic 
claim, however, Smith v. Batchelor clearly recognizes that an 
attorney pro se litigant can recover damages; in fact, 
our Utah Constitution extends this right to attorney-pro-se liti-
gants and lay-pro-se litigants alike. Justice Stewart, dissenting 
in Smith v. Batchelor, accepted the majority's "discriminati/on" 
position, but pointed out that it was misplaced and inapplicable. 
No other case can be found which, if analyzed carefully un-
der its controlling law and facts, is identical to Smith v. Batchelor, 
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Further, for the trial court in this case to accept the all-en-
compassing, out-of-context and broad statement from Smith v« 
Batchelor as controlling all manner of attorney pro se appearances, 
the result would effectively bar all persons from their constitut-
ional right to represent themselves in court as guaranteed by 
Utah Constitution, Art. I, Sec* 11: 
Sec. .11. (Courts open—Redress of injuries.) 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury 
done to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have 
remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered with-
out denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred 
from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this 
State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is 
a party. 
Further, the foregoing constitutional right, coupled with 
Art. I, Sec. 7 (due process) and Art. I, Sec. 24- (uniform oper-
ation of the laws), in total effect, would be nullified and cir-
cumvented if litigants could represent themselves (pro se) in 
court but would be denied all manner of recovery because of their 
pro se appearance. That result is exactly what took place in 
this case under the trial court's decision and judgment. 
Cases can be found from other jurisdictions which seemingly 
represent a "split of authority11 of sorts as to whether pro se 
litigants (be they lay persons or attorneys) can recover "att-
orney fees" in litigation. However, each case must be carefully 
analyzed because the critical factor in nearly every case involves 
a rule of court, a statute, or a contractual provision providing 
for attorney fees (i.e., as procedural "costs") to be awarded 
in addition to the substantive award constituting the gist of the 
action. The foregoing distinction is critical* 
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As illustrative, an annotation at 78 A*L.R. 3rd 1119 deals 
with the right of a pro se litigant to recover attorney's fees 
against an opposing party as an elementof costs* And, as previous-
ly mentioned, since at common law attorney's fees could not be 
recovered as costs against an opponent in litigation, there must 
be a rule of court, statute, or an underlying agreement in order 
that they be allowed in such situations. 20 Am Jur 2d, Costs, #72. 
Numerous "cost-type" lay-pro-se and attorney-pro-se litigant 
cases providing for "attorney's fees" under one of the three men-
tioned categories were cited in Smith V. Batchelor—itself a 
"cost-type" attorney's fee situation controlled by statute* 
In comparing this case with Smith v. Batchelor, we find no 
discrimination problem involving a lay-pro-se litigant and an 
attorney-pro-se litigant; nor does this case involve the recovery 
of "costs" or their equivalent pursuant to some court rule, stat-
ute, or underlying agreement—procedural relief* Stated again, 
this case seeks damages resulting from taking steps necessary to 
remove an encumbrance placed on the title to real property* And, 
as set forth in Dowse v. Doris Trust Co* and Olsen v. Kidman, 
necessary title-clearing expenses, including attorney's fees, 
are included in the measure of damages. Therefore, damages based 
on substantive rights distinguishes this case even further from 
the pro-se-attorney problem discussed in Smith v* Batchelor. 
And, since Smith's pro se appearance did not deny him recovery 
of back pay and overtime, the rationale of that case actually 
supports plaintiffs-appellants' position in this case. 
Nor has an examination of any of the few cases denying re-
covery of attorney's fees as "costs" pursuant to rule of court, 
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statute, "underlying agreement, or common law, revealed a single 
instance where damages based upon the underlying substantive right 
involved have ever been denied by reason of either an attorney-pro-
se or a lay-pro-se appearance• To have done so would have encount-
ered constitutional objections in almost every state and a possi-
ble encounter with the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 
Cases awarding pro se attorney's fees have abandoned any rule 
or requirement that such services be supported by actual cash pay-
ments; instead, the test of the reasonable value of the services 
rendered has been adopted by the great majority of the courts. 
In the case of Renfrew v. Loysen (1986), 222 Cal. Reporter 413, a 
long line of California cases (many of which were quoted by other 
courts) were overruled and rejected with the following reasoning: 
The logic of past decisions that do not allow an attorney 
to recover fees when he appears on his own behalf is unclear. 
Although such an attorney does not pay a fee or incur any fin-
ancial liability therefor to another, his time spent in pre-
paring his case is not somehow rendered less valuable because 
he is representing himself rather than a third party. Ac-
cordingly, it appears he should be compensated when he rep-
resents himself if he would otherwise be entitled to such 
compensation. 
It seems obvious that the prosecution of an ...action by an 
attorney acting pro se involves a tangible commitment of time 
and skills—a lawyer's only 'stock in trade1—having a sub-
stantial economic value which realistically could have been 
available for other gainful application. 
And from Winer v. Jonal Corp. (Montana 1975),5^5 P. 2d lo94: 
The better rule is that a party who appears for himself, 
and is himself an attorney or counselor at law, is entitled to 
be awarded the same costs as he would be entitled to had he 
employed another. 
In a case which analyzed the pros and cons of allowing an 
attorney to recover for his pro se efforts, the New York case of 
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McMahon v, Schwartz (N.Y. 1981), 4-38 N.Y.S. 2d 215, made the fol-
lowing observations: 
The plaintiff, like any other professional man, is paid for 
his time and services, and if he renders them in the management 
and trial of his own cause it may amount to as much pecuniary 
loss or damage to him as if he paid another attorney for doing 
it. 
It can make no difference to a party who, by law, is bound 
to pay costs including attorney's fees, whether the fees are 
to be paid to an attorney representing himself or another 
attorney employed by him. 
III. 
APPELLANTS SHOULD BE AWARDED ADDITIONAL ATTORNEYS FEES 
AS DAMAGES ON APPEAL. 
Recognizing that attorney's fees and court costs and other 
expenditures necessary to clear title in a slander of title case 
is an equitable concept; recovering those expenditures is an-
other matter. Too often, as in this case, it plainly appears that 
a separate trial and its attendant expenses could easily exceed the 
amount recoverable as damages under Dowse and Kidman. And even, 
as here, if the expenses and the costs of litigation are combined 
in a single action (Exh. P-13) and segregated, the trial-recovery 
portion of the total will exceed the title-clearing portion. 
There is no "cost-type" rule of court, statute or agreement that 
will compensate appellants for the trial-recovery portion of their 
expenditures in this case. 
If the trial court had awarded appellants judgment for their 
title-clearing expenditures in the sum of $2,334-.39* appellants 
would have recovered 50% of their total title-clearing and trial 
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expenditures (assuming that they could collect on the judgment)— 
gaining exactly nothing, But what if, as here, judgment for their 
title-clearing expenditures be denied at the trial court level and 
they are forced to appeal? 
Inasmuch as the litigation expenses necessary to clear the 
title to property in a slander of title action where a plaintiff 
prevails are not finalized until the judgment is affirmed on appeal 
(or, conversely, where a plaintiff is denied recovery at trial 
and must appeal to secure what should have been the judgment), 
appellate courts have recognized that attorney's fees on appeal 
should be awarded as an extension of title-clearing damages• 
In the case of Hamilton v. Telex Corporation (Okla* 1981), 
625 P« 2d 106, where suit was brought to recover attorney's fees 
both under a contract and a statutory provision, it was held that 
pro se attorney's fees should be awarded both at trial stage and 
on appeal. The case involved a combination of regular legal ser-
vices and also legal services under the statute. Although a 
"cost-type" statutory provision for attorney's fees was involved, 
the case is basically similar to this case in its reasoning and 
result. 
Even more to the point, in the slander of title action ad-
dressed in Olsen v. Kidman the Utah Supreme Court ruled on appeal 
as follows: 
The judgment is affirmed. The case is remanded to the trial 
court to assess as damages the reasonable amount of attorney's 
fees in defending the judgment on appeal. 
(Underlining added) 
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CONCLUSION 
By their very nature, slander-of-title cases usually require 
proof that contains factual circumstances sufficient to justify 
both compensatory and punitive damages. However, once the degree 
of proof has established a cause of action, it is often difficult 
to present additional evidence of sufficient wrongdoing necessary 
to convince a trier of fact that punitive damages should be awarded. 
Be that as it may, in this case the reasonable expenditures of 
clearing title in the amount of $2,334.39 are undisputed. 
As for the remainder of the expenditures in the amount of 
$2,290.00 (as shown on Exh. P-13), there is no specific rule of 
court, "cost-type" statute, or underlying agreement providing for 
trial-related expenditures in this case. On the other hand, appell-
ants submit that, considering all of the facts and circumstances 
in this case, appellees1 defenses to appellants1 monetary claims 
and allegations at trial were without merit and were taken in bad 
faith. As such, undisputed trial-related expenditures in the 
amount of $2,290.00 should also be awarded to appellants pursuant 
to 78-27-56, Utah Code Anno. 1953* as amended. 
Because of the necessity of having to maintain this appeal— 
and as expressly set forth in Olsen v. Kidman—appellants are en-
titled to pro se attorney's fees on appeal. 
ACCORDINGLY, appellants submit that this Court make and enter 
its decision and order that appellants have judgment for title-
clearing expenditures in the amount of $2,334.39 and trial-related 
expenditures in the sum of $2,290.00, both amounts being undisputed; 
and, further, that this matter be remanded to the trial court to 
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assess, as damages, the reasonable amount of pro se attorney's 
fees in securing judgment on appeal. 
Respectfully submitted* ^^^ 
Glen E. Fuller (pro se) 
Connie J. Fuller (pro se) 
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS 
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